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Abstract
Despite extensive research, the very existence of unconscious learning in humans remains much debated. Skepticism arises
chiefly from the difficulty in assessing the level of awareness of the complex associations learned in classical implicit learn-
ing paradigms. Here, we show that simple associations between colors and motion directions can be learned unconsciously.
In each trial, participants had to report the motion direction of a patch of colored dots but unbeknownst to the participants,
two out of the three possible colors were always associated with a given direction/response, while one was uninformative.
We confirm the lack of awareness by using several tasks, fulfilling the most stringent criteria. In addition, we show the cru-
cial role of trial-by-trial feedback, and that both the stimulus–response (motor) and stimulus–stimulus (perceptual) associa-
tions were learned. In conclusion, we demonstrate that simple associations between supraliminal stimulus features can be
learned unconsciously, providing a novel framework to study unconscious learning.
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Introduction
Unconscious learning can be defined as “learning without
awareness, regardless of what sort of learning is being acquired”
(Shanks and Stjohn, 1994). One can frame the current literature
on unconscious learning along two dimensions: the first one de-
termines whether the stimuli used during learning are supra-
liminal or subliminal, whereas the second dimension
characterizes the complexity of the rules or associations to be
learnt (Fig. 1A). More specifically, the term “complex rule” is
used here to refer to task structures that are composed of a large
number of contingencies, such as in sequence learning tasks (in
which numerous transition between successive key presses
have to be learned), or artificial grammar tasks (in which a set
of probabilistic rules drive the generation of grammatical
strings). In opposition, simple rules can be defined as task struc-
tures composed of a small number of contingencies. Notably,
there is not a precise separation between these two classes of
rules, which rather define two extremes of a continuum. The
use of supraliminal stimuli to induce learning of abstract, com-
plex rules (top left corner in Fig. 1A) is the hallmark of implicit
learning (Reber, 1967). Throughout the years, many experimen-
tal paradigms have provided reliable and replicable evidence of
implicit learning, from artificial grammar learning (Reber, 1967)
to sequence learning (Nissen and Bullemer, 1987), from control
of complex systems (Berry and Broadbent, 1984) to statistical
learning (Saffran et al., 1999). In the example of the artificial
grammar case, the complexity of the rules ensues from the
presence of a large set of probabilistic associations that generate
the strings. Moving to the opposite side of the theoretical space
described in Fig. 1A, subliminal stimuli used to learn simple as-
sociations set the framework of what has been defined as sub-
liminal learning (Clark and Squire, 1998; Clark et al., 2002;
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Olsson and Phelps, 2004). In a typical subliminal learning para-
digm, a cue, which is nonconsciously perceived, predicts an out-
come or prompts a response. In this case, the complexity is low
since there is only one association driving the behavioral effect,
although the stimuli are perceived subliminally. Looking at the
top right corner of Fig. 1A, we find the learning of subliminal
stimuli associated with complex rules. This has been poorly in-
vestigated because of both methodological and interpretational
issues. On the one hand, it is difficult to perform complicated
associations between subliminal, rapidly presented stimuli
(Atas et al., 2014); on the other hand, this kind of learning would
not be of particular interest since it would not add any insight-
ful perspective to the existing frameworks (Kido and Makioka,
2015). Finally, and rather surprisingly, there has been only a sin-
gle attempt, to the extent of our knowledge, at studying directly
the unconscious learning of supraliminal cues governed by sim-
ple rules (bottom left corner of Fig. 1A). In this series of experi-
ments from the late 1980s, Lewicki and colleagues found that
human participants could learn hidden covariations between
the features of different stimuli in the absence of explicit aware-
ness (Lewicki et al., 1987, 1992, 1994). Despite the interest raised
by this approach, the interpretation of these studies has been
thoroughly criticized (Shanks and Stjohn, 1994) and, even more
crucially, their findings have failed the test of independent rep-
lication (Hendrickx et al., 1997), leaving the question of the ac-
tual existence of this type of unconscious learning
unaddressed.
Yet experimental support for the existence of unconscious
learning of simple associations between conscious cues would
provide decisive responses to enduring criticisms that have
been formulated against the existence of unconscious learning.
Indeed, Shanks and colleagues have listed four criteria to fulfill
in order to provide evidence in favor of unconscious learning:
the sensitivity criterion regards the sensitivity of the measures
of awareness; the information criterion suggests that the mea-
sure of awareness should probe the same information as the ex-
perimental task; the immediacy criterion imposes that the tests
should be concomitant (or follow immediately) the experimen-
tal task; and finally the relevance criterion suggests that the
measure of awareness should avoid any irrelevant information.
The failure of the current literature in meeting these criteria
suggested a substantial lack of evidence in favor of the exis-
tence of unconscious learning (Lovibond and Shanks, 2002;
Newell and Shanks, 2014; Shanks and Stjohn, 1994).
To address this issue, we developed a simple motion direc-
tion discrimination task in which participants were asked to re-
port the motion direction of a colored patch of dots;
unbeknownst to them, there was an association between mo-
tion direction and 2 out of the 3 possible colors. In 10% of trials,
participants were asked to report also the color of the patch to-
gether with the motion. In Experiment 1, we tested whether
participants were able to learn this association. In Experiment
2, we specifically investigated the extent to which participants
were aware of the relevant contingencies, addressing the four
criteria suggested by Shanks and colleagues (Newell and
Shanks, 2014; Shanks and Stjohn, 1994). In Experiment 3, we
studied the role of feedback in such learning. Finally, in
Experiment 4, we tested whether learning involved either sen-
sory–motor or sensory–sensory associations.
Experiment 1
Participants
Fourteen healthy participants (7 females, mean age ¼ 24.2
years, SD ¼ 5.63) took part in the first experiment, receiving
monetary compensation for their participation. We chose an a
priori sample size of 14 subjects, since we had no prior data on
which to base our initial estimate. In this and all subsequent ex-
periments, we stopped acquiring subjects when we reached the
sample size planned before starting the experiments. All of
them reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All experi-
ments were carried out according to the Declaration of Helsinki
and were approved by the Ethics Committee of the Universite´
catholique de Louvain. Written informed consents were ob-
tained from all the participants.
Procedure
The experiment took place in a quiet room, with the partici-
pants sitting comfortably on a chair in front of a 19” CRT screen
with a 100 Hz refresh rate. The distance between the screen and
the chin support was 58 cm. The task was implemented using
version 3.0.9 of the Psychotoolbox (Brainard, 1997) in Matlab 7.5
(The MathWorks, Inc. Natick, MA, USA).
At the beginning of each trial, a white cross was displayed at
the center of the screen for 600 ms on a gray background (gray
levels 0.7). A patch of moving dots was then displayed for
300 ms in the center of the screen, followed by a 500 ms blank
screen, after which a new trial began (Fig. 1B). The stimulus was
a patch of 2400 dots with a radius of 12. Each dot was updated
every 10 ms. All the dots had a lifetime of three frames, during
which they followed a straight line and were then displaced to a
new random location. In order to minimize the retinal persis-
tence effect and avoid the perception of the dot trajectory as
lines on the screen, each dot was displayed every other frame,
Figure 1. Schematic depiction of the unconscious learning framework
(a) and experimental design (b). In the scheme (a), the x-axis repre-
sents the stimulus perceptibility (subliminal or supraliminal) and
the y-axis represents the rules complexity (simple–complex rules).
Within this space, we define four possible categories of unconscious
learning paradigms. In the lower part (b), the experimental design is
shown: following a fixation cross displayed for 600 ms, a patch of
moving dots was displayed for 300 ms. The participants had 500 ms
to provide a response.
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such that there were two interleaved streams of dots displayed
alternately. The coherence of the dot motion, i.e. the percentage
of dots moving coherently in the same direction, was kept con-
stant during each block.
Participants were instructed to discriminate the motion di-
rection of the dots. They could respond anytime from the patch
onset until the end of the trial, by clicking on the left or right
mouse buttons with their right hand to indicate a leftward or
rightward motion, respectively. Auditory feedback was provided
at the end of each trial, signaling a correct (high pitch) or incor-
rect (low pitch) response. Failure to provide a response was con-
sidered as an error.
The experiment consisted of 20 blocks of 60 trials each, and
lasted around 45 min altogether (Table 1). The task started with
seven blocks of “perceptual training” in which the stimulus con-
sisted exclusively of white dots (gray levels 0.1) in order to de-
termine the level of coherence that will be used for each
individual for the rest of the experiment. Indeed, during this
training phase, the coherence of the patch was tuned block by
block so as to maintain the response accuracy between 70% and
80%. The first block was always performed with 100% coherence
patches, but in the following blocks, as soon as accuracy
reached 90%, the coherence level was decreased by 15% (or by
20% if accuracy was 100%) in the subsequent block. Conversely,
if accuracy fell below 70% in a block, coherence was increased
by 10% in the subsequent one. In the following 13 blocks of the
“unconscious learning” phase (Table 1), colored patches were
shown (red, green, or blue), and motion coherence was kept
constant and equal to the coherence value of the last block of
the “perceptual training” phase. Crucially, and unbeknownst to
participants, in the “unconscious learning” phase, colors and
motion direction were associated: one color was always pre-
sented in association with leftward motion, another color was
always associated with rightward motion, and the third color
was equally likely to be associated with rightward and leftward
patch motion (Table 2). The color–motion associations were
pseudo-randomized across subjects; colors were pseudo-
randomly interleaved every three trials (e.g. red–blue–green,
green–red–blue, etc.), such that no color appeared more often
than twice in a row. Importantly, the association between color
and motion was discontinued during the 16th and 17th blocks
and restored in the last three blocks (Table 1). Furthermore, to
ensure that color information was actually processed by partici-
pants, they were asked to report the color of the patch in 10% of
the trials, selected randomly.
Participants responded by clicking with the mouse on one of
three colored circles displayed on the screen. None of the partic-
ipants reported explicit awareness of the association between
colors and motion direction when questioned about it during
debriefing at the end of the experiment.
Data analysis
The behavioral data were analyzed with Generalized Linear
Mixed Models (GLMM) implemented in the SAS 9.3 Software
(SAS Institute, Cary, NC, USA). We tested two GLMMs, consider-
ing accuracy (binary) and reaction times (normal) as dependent
variables. In both models, the following independent factors
were considered: BLOCK (from 8 to 20), ASSOCIATION (set to 1 if
the color was associated with a motion direction, 0 otherwise),
COLORS (three levels; included to account for possible effects of
the color of the patch on motion discrimination irrespective of
its association to a motion direction), and SUBJECT (to account
for intersubject differences). Both models were fitted using all
the trials, avoiding any preprocessing.
Results
We found that participants’ accuracy was higher in the trials in
which the color of the dots provided information on the motion
direction, as revealed by the factor ASSOCIATION in the GLMM
analysis (F(1,10698) ¼ 13.13, P < 0.001) (Fig. 2). The lack of signif-
icant ASSOCIATION  BLOCK interaction prevents us from con-
cluding anything about the dynamics of the learning, but
suggests, in accordance with the previous studies (Turk-Browne
et al., 2010), that such learning already occurs in the early phase
of the experiment (Supplementary Fig. S1). The behavioral ad-
vantage induced by the predictive colors disappeared in blocks
16 and 17, during which the contingencies were disrupted, and
quickly recovered in the subsequent blocks, after the associa-
tion had been restored, as confirmed by a GLMM performed on
data gathered from blocks 15th to 18th. This analysis revealed
a significant effect of the factor ASSOCIATION (F(1,4098) ¼ 11.68,
P < 0.001), and of the BLOCK  ASSOCIATION interaction
(F(4,4098) ¼ 2.75, P ¼ 0.026). A Tukey-corrected post-hoc analysis
of this interaction revealed better accuracy for predictive colors
in block 15th (t ¼ 3.39, P < 0.001) and 18th (t ¼ 2.59, P ¼ 0.
009), but not in blocks 16th and 17th (t ¼ 0.48, P > 0.250 and t
¼ 0.51, P > 0.250). Overall, these analyses confirmed that par-
ticipants learned the associations between color and motion di-
rection. Regarding the reaction times (RT), only the factor
ASSOCIATION was close to be significant (F(1,10533) ¼ 3.20, P ¼
0.0736), whereas all other factors and interactions were far from
being significant (all F < 1.8, P > 0.10) (Supplementary Fig. S2).
This was expected, given that the motion signal was displayed
for only 300 ms and that the participants were provided a very
short period of time to respond, in order to emphasize the effect
of the color–motion association on accuracy rather than on RT.
Table 1. Experimental designs of the four experiments
Color Motion Response
Color 1 Right Right
Color 2 Left Left
Color 3 R/L R/L
Table 2. Associations between color, motion direction, and response in Experiments 1, 2, and 3
Perceptual training
(white dots)
Unconscious learning
(colored dots)
Change in the associative
structure (colored dots)
Unconscious learning
(colored dots)
Explicit tasks
(familiarity, generative,
questionnaire)
Explicit Blocks
(colored dots)
Exp 1 7 blocks 8 blocks 2 blocks 3 blocks
Exp 2 7 blocks 8 blocks 2 blocks 2 blocks
Exp 3 7 blocks 8 blocks 2 blocks 3 blocks
Exp 4 8 blocks 8 blocks 2 blocks 2 blocks
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Discussion
Overall, this first experiment provides evidence in favor of ro-
bust learning of the color–motion association. In Experiment 2,
we aimed at testing directly participants’ awareness of the
color–motion direction association by means of two tasks and
one questionnaire.
Experiment 2
Participants and procedure
Twenty-three healthy participants (12 females, mean age ¼
22.73 years, SD ¼ 2.59) participated in the second experiment
for monetary compensation. Because we expected negative re-
sults in the awareness tasks, we increased the sample size to 24
in order to improve our statistical power. Since one of the sub-
jects did not come on the day of the experiment, we finally ac-
quired data on 23 subjects. All of them reported normal or
corrected-to-normal vision. The first part of the experiment (i.e.
“perceptual training” and “unconscious learning” phases) was
exactly the same as in Experiment 1 (Table 1). The second part
was executed immediately after the first one and consisted of
three tasks, performed in a pseudo-randomly order by the dif-
ferent subjects. The first task was a generation task consisting
of two interleaved types of trials. In the first type of trials (gen-
erative color trials), a patch of white dots moved leftward or
rightward for 300 ms, while in the second type of trials (genera-
tive motion trials), a static but colored patch was displayed for
the same amount of time. Participants were asked to associate
either a color to the white moving patch, or a motion direction
to the colored but static dots; the response was provided by
clicking with the mouse on the selected color or motion direc-
tion. The entire block was composed of 60 trials (30 for each
type). The other task was a familiarity test in which participants
were asked to rate, from 1 to 10, the familiarity of displayed
patches. All six possible combinations of colors and motion di-
rections were included in this task, which thus also included
color–motion combinations to which participants had never
been exposed during the experiment. Overall, in this task, 42 tri-
als were performed. The generative and familiarity tasks took
about 4 min each. The third test was a short questionnaire with
three questions: the first question inquired about any perceived
difference between the rightward and leftward motion direc-
tions, the second one concerned colors, and the last question
asked participants to indicate explicitly whether they had no-
ticed any association between color and motion direction.
Finally, participants were told about the association between
colors and motion directions, and were asked to perform two
additional blocks of the discrimination task while being now ex-
plicitly aware of the association.
The same analyses as in Experiment 1 were performed twice
on two distinct datasets: once on all the subjects (n ¼ 23), and
then only on those who did not provide a correct response in
the questionnaire about the color/motion association (“implicit”
group, n ¼ 18). Given that the results of these analyses unveiled
a lack of effect, we computed the Bayes Factor (BF) to estimate
the likelihood of the null hypothesis being true (Smith, 2001).
The BF can be used as an alternative way to test statistical hy-
pothesis. It relies on the estimation of the probability of a statis-
tical model (or hypothesis) given the observed data. One major
advantage of this approach is that it allows researchers to esti-
mate the validity of the null hypothesis, in comparison to alter-
native hypotheses. Indicatively, a BF between 0.3 and 3 suggests
a lack of sensitivity. A BF below 0.3 or above 3 provides strong
evidence in support for the alternative hypothesis, or for the
null hypothesis, respectively. In order to compute the BF, we
compared the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) estimated
from each model with and without the explanatory variable
(Masson, 2011; Smith, 2001).
Results
We confirmed that the discrimination accuracy was higher in
trials with predictive colors than with the control color (Fig. 3)
(ASSOCIATION: F(1,10664) ¼ 4.58, P < 0.001). We also found a
progressive increase in accuracy across blocks (BLOCK: F(7,154)
¼ 4.58, P < 0.001) but no significant ASSOCIATION  BLOCK in-
teraction (F(7,10664) ¼ 0.69, P > 0.250) (see also Supplementary
Fig. S2). Similar results were obtained when restricting the anal-
ysis to the “implicit group” only (n ¼ 18; ASSOCIATION:
F(1,8344) ¼ 17.44, P < 0.001; BLOCK: F(7,119) ¼ 3.23, P ¼ 0.003,
interaction F(7,8344) ¼ 0.84, P > 0.250). Regarding the RT
(Supplementary Fig. S1), only the factor ASSOCIATION was sig-
nificant, with faster responses being associated with predictive
colors (ASSOCIATION: F(1,10499) ¼ 25.93, P < 0.001; BLOCK:
F(7,154) ¼ 1.23, P > 0.250; interaction F(7,10499) ¼ 1.00, P > 0.
250; implicit group, n ¼ 18: ASSOCIATION: F(1,8200) ¼ 10.77, P ¼
0.001; BLOCK: F(7,119) ¼ 1.21, P > 0.250; interaction F(7,8200) ¼
0.89, P > 0.250).
We compared the accuracy and RT of all the participants in
the last two blocks of the “unconscious learning” phase (blocks
14th and 15th) with the data obtained in the “explicit blocks”
performed at the end of the experiment (E1 and E2, Fig. 3), after
the color–motion association had been explicitly revealed to the
subjects (Table 1). As expected, we found a significant effect
of the factor ASSOCIATION on accuracy (F(1,5426) ¼ 145.95, P<
0.001), but not of the factor accounting for the awareness of the
subjects (EXPLICITNESS: F(1,22) ¼ 1.59, P ¼ 0.220); however, the
interaction between these two factors was highly significant
(F(1,5426) ¼ 45.86, P < 0.001). Similarly, the analysis on RT re-
vealed an effect of all the factors and their interaction
(ASSOCIATION: F(1,5326) ¼ 168.94, P < 0.001; EXPLICITNESS:
F(1,22) ¼ 17.41, P < 0.001; interaction: F(1,5326) ¼ 89.31, P<
0.001). These changes in both RT and accuracy following
Figure 2. Performance data from Experiment 1. Error bars represent
standard errors. The colors represent the two conditions (red: infor-
mative color condition, blue: nonpredictive color condition). The vio-
lation of the association in block 16th and 17th is marked by the
light green rectangle. The performance during the “perceptual train-
ing” phase with white patches (blocks 1 to 7) is not displayed.
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awareness of the association suggests a drastic change in strat-
egy, in which participants started presumably to base their deci-
sion primarily on the color information.
Concerning the questionnaire, only 5 subjects out of 23 ex-
plicitly reported the color–motion association. Another subject
reported only one correct color–motion association, and two
other subjects reported incorrect color–motion associations. All
other subjects reported having noticed no systematic associa-
tion whatsoever.
Regarding the generative tasks, in trials in which partici-
pants were asked to associate a motion direction to a color (Fig.
4A), we considered as dependent variables the motion direction
chosen by the participants, and, as factors, the COLORS and TASK-
ORDER (categorical variable, accounting for whether the task was
performed before or after the questionnaire). We found no sig-
nificant main effects for either group (all subjects, n ¼ 23:
COLORS: F(2,659) ¼ 0.29, P > 0.250; TASK-ORDER: F(1,659) ¼ 0.29,
P > 0.250; “implicit group,” n ¼ 18: COLORS: F(2,48) ¼ 0.12, P >
0.250; TASK-ORDER: F(1,465) ¼ 0.79, P ¼ 0.3752), but found a sig-
nificant interaction for the group including all the subjects (all
subjects: F(2,659) ¼ 3.07, P ¼ 0.0474), suggesting that, after the
questionnaire, subjects were more likely to associate the infor-
mative colors to the correct motion direction, as revealed by a
significant post-hoc analysis (difference between left-motion
associated color and right-motion associated color: t ¼ 4.03,
Tukey–Kramer corrected P < 0.001; between second informa-
tive color and noninformative color t ¼ 6.06, Tukey–Kramer cor-
rected P < 0.001). The significant interaction was, however, not
observed in the “implicit group” (F(2,465) ¼ 0.53, P > 0.250). To
confirm these negative findings in the implicit group, we com-
puted a BF by comparing the BIC obtained from each model
with and without the explanatory variable COLORS (Masson,
2011; Smith, 2001). The results confirm a lack of effect of the
COLORS factor for the implicit group (implicit group: BF ¼ 33.11,
P < 0.03). The second generative task (Fig. 4B), in which partici-
pants associated a color to a given motion direction, revealed
no effects in any factors or interaction for both groups (all the
subjects: MOTION-DIRECTION: F(1,42) ¼ 0.58, P > 0.250; TASK-
ORDER: F(1,643) ¼ 0.23, P > 0.250); interaction: F(1,643) ¼ 0.91, P
> 0.250); implicit group: MOTION-DIRECTION: F(1,32) ¼ 1.32, P
¼ 0.2599; TASK-ORDER: F(1,503) ¼ 0.01, P > 0.250); interaction:
F(1,503) ¼ 2.10, P ¼ 0.1480). The BF confirmed the lack of result
for the factor MOTION-DIRECTION and its interaction for both
groups (all subjects: BF ¼ 20.08, P < 0.05, implicit group: BF ¼
90.01, P < 0.02).
Considering the familiarity task (Fig. 4C), we did not find any
significant effect for the factors ASSOCIATION (correct associa-
tion, incorrect association or control color; F(2,48) ¼ 0.14, P >
0.250), TASK-ORDER (F(1,688) ¼ 2.09, P ¼ 0.1491), and their in-
teraction (F(2,688) ¼ 0.46, P > 0.250) for the implicit group (n ¼
18). The BF confirmed the lack of effect for the ASSOCIATION
factor in the model (BF ¼ 38.11, P < 0.03). When considering all
subjects, we found a significant effect of the interaction be-
tween the factors (F(2,881) ¼ 3.31, P ¼ 0.0370), but nor a main ef-
fect of the task order, neither of the association factor
(ASSOCIATION: F(2,63) ¼ 1.14, P > 0.250; TASK-ORDER: F(1,881)
¼ 0.84, P > 0.250). This interaction shows a significant differ-
ence between the first informative color and the noninforma-
tive color, as revealed by a post-hoc analysis (t ¼ 3.86, Tukey–
Kramer corrected P < 0.002).
Moreover, to confirm that all the tests measured the same
variable (i.e. awareness), we correlated the results of the genera-
tive and familiarity tasks. In order to do so, we computed the
Euclidean distance from the rates (or proportions of answers in
the generative tasks) provided by each subject to the optimal
“explicit” behavior, such that small distances would reflect
more awareness of the associations. The results confirmed a
correlation between the two generative tasks (Pearson correla-
tion, r ¼ 0.53, P < 0.01) and between the familiarity task and
the second generative task (assigning color to motion, r ¼
0.5823, P < 0.01), but not between familiarity and the first gen-
erative task (assigning motion to color, r ¼ 0.1648, P> 0.25).
Altogether, these correlational analyses confirmed that all the
tests measured the awareness of the learnt associations
(Supplementary Fig. S3).
Discussion
In Experiment 2, we found that when restricting the analyses to
the group of subjects that failed to report the association be-
tween color and motion, the learning of this association was
still robust in spite of the fact that none of the awareness tasks
showed significant results. This demonstrates that even though
some participants gained explicit awareness of the association,
learning took place in the absence of awareness for most of
them.
The difference between the last two blocks of the implicit
phase and the two explicit blocks highlighted a change in the
Figure 3. Accuracy data from Experiment 2. In the upper part, the data
from the group of subjects who did not provide the correct associa-
tions in the questionnaire is shown (implicit group, n ¼ 18), whereas
all the participants are included in the data shown in the lower
panel (n ¼ 23). Error bars represent standard errors. E1 and E2 are
two blocks in which participants were instructed about the associa-
tions. The data from the “perceptual training” phase with white
patches (from 1 to 7) is not displayed in the figure.
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strategy adopted by the participants: when the association be-
came fully explicit, participants seem to focus mostly on the
color feature rather than on the motion. Such difference
strongly suggests that if the participants had explicit knowledge
of the association during the main experiment, their behavior
should have been similar to that exhibited in the explicit blocks.
These results thus provide strong evidence for the unconscious
nature of the learning.
In Experiment 3, we attempted to gain insight into the basic
learning mechanisms at play in our task. We wondered whether
participants learned the association through reinforcement or
Hebbian learning. To address this question, we investigated the
role of feedback in the learning of the color-motion association.
Experiment 3
Participants and procedure
Fourteen healthy participants (9 females, mean age ¼ 23.42
years, SD ¼ 1.74) participated in the third experiment for
Figure 4. Results from the awareness testing tasks. The data from the participants who did not respond correctly to the questionnaire (implicit
group, n ¼ 18) is shown on the left, whereas all participants are included in the dataset shown on the right (n ¼ 23). Participants were split
based on whether they performed the awareness testing tasks before (light colors) or after (darker colors) the questionnaire. Results from the
generative motion task (a): on the y-axis, the probability of choosing rightward motion is shown. The results from the generative color task are
displayed in the middle part (b): values on the y-axis represent the probability of choosing either of the three color conditions displayed along
the x-axis (congruent, incongruent, or neutral color). In the last part (c) the results from the familiarity task are shown: on the y-axis, the aver-
age familiarity ratings associated with the three different types of patches are shown (correct predictive association, incorrect association, or
nonpredictive association).
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monetary compensation. All of them reported normal or
corrected-to-normal vision. The experimental design was the
same as in Experiment 1, except that no auditory feedback was
provided during the “unconscious learning” phase of the experi-
ment (Table 1). Therefore, we used the same sample size as in
the first experiment. Auditory feedback was still provided dur-
ing the first 7 blocks of training with the white dots patches in
order to obtain a level of response accuracy between 70% and
80% as in Experiment 1.
Results
As in the previous experiment, we analyzed accuracy and RT in
two GLMMs. Regarding accuracy (Fig. 5), we did not find any sig-
nificant effect: ASSOCIATION (F(1,10697) ¼ 2.41, P ¼ 0.1204),
BLOCK: F(12,156) ¼ 0.87, P > 0.250, COLORS: F(2,25) ¼ 1.29, P >
0.250, BLOCK  ASSOCIATION: F(12,10697) ¼ 1.15, P > 0.250). In
order to test specifically the lack of effect of the factor
ASSOCIATION, we computed the BF on the basis of the BIC ob-
tained from the models with and without this factor. This anal-
ysis confirmed the lack of effect of the factor ASSOCIATION on
the response accuracy (BF ¼ 2.8478  1011, P < 0.0001). The
very large value of the BF, along with the highly significant esti-
mated P-value, confirmed that the sample size provided enough
statistical power to properly test the hypothesis. Concerning
the RT (Supplementary Fig. S1), we found a significant effect of
COLORS (F(2,25) ¼ 4.04, P ¼ 0.0301), while the other effects were
not significant (ASSOCIATION F(1,10254) ¼ 0.05, P > 0.250;
BLOCK: F(12,156) ¼ 0.85, P > 0.250; BLOCK  ASSOCIATION
F(12,10254) ¼ 1.35, P ¼ 0.1850)). The color effect revealed that
overall the subjects were slower in detecting the blue color, irre-
spective of its association with the motion direction.
We then compared the response accuracy in Experiments 1
and 3, by means of a GLMM with COLORS, ASSOCIATION,
BLOCK, SUBJECT, and EXPERIMENT as factors. Interestingly, the
results revealed a significant effect of the factor ASSOCIATION
(F(1,21615) ¼ 33.68, P < 0.001), BLOCK (F(12,156) ¼ 1.91, P ¼
0.0375), EXPERIMENT (F(1,21615) ¼ 42.44, P < 0.001) and the in-
teraction EXPERIMENT  ASSOCIATION (F(1,21615) ¼ 17.55, P <
0.001), thus confirming the importance of the auditory feedback
not only in performing the task, but also in the unconscious
learning of the association.
Discussion
Experiment 3 indicates that when no feedback on response ac-
curacy is provided, learning fails to take place. This suggests
that this type of unconscious learning relies on reinforcement
learning mechanisms (Dayan and Balleine, 2002; Sutton and
Barto, 1998), rather than on Hebbian-like associative learning
between concurrent features of the stimuli (Munakata and
Pfaffly, 2004). Since reinforcement learning is usually studied in
the context of stimulus-response associations (Dayan and
Balleine, 2002), these findings suggested that participants may
have learned to associate the color of the stimulus with the re-
sponse dictated by the corresponding motion direction, as op-
posed to associating directly the color with the motion. We
tested this hypothesis in Experiment 4.
Experiment 4
Participants and procedure
Twenty-four healthy participants (14 females, mean age ¼
27.04, SD ¼ 4.78) joined the fourth experiment for monetary
compensation. All of them reported normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. The sample size was chosen from an expected
effect size of 0.4676% (estimated from Experiment 1) and aiming
for a power of 0.80 and an alpha of 0.05. The experimental de-
sign was similar to that of Experiment 1, except as detailed
below.
The “perceptual training” phase with the white dots lasted
for 8 blocks, followed by 12 blocks of “unconscious learning”
phase with colored patches and fixed coherence levels (Table 1).
Auditory feedback was provided trial by trial in every block. The
motion of the dots was directed upward or downward, and the
participants were instructed to respond left or right to indicate
the motion direction. The rule linking the response to the mo-
tion direction changed in every block, so that if the upward mo-
tion was associated with the left response in one block, the left
response was associated with the downward motion in the sub-
sequent block. This alternation of the rules was reminded to the
subjects both verbally by the experimenter and visually at the
beginning of each block by displaying a message for 5 s on the
computer screen. Importantly, the subjects were randomly sep-
arated in two groups: in the first group, the association between
color and motion was kept constant during the whole experi-
ment, while in the second group, it was the association between
color and response which was kept constant (Table 3). In this
way, only one association (either color–motion direction or col-
or–response side) was maintained during the whole experi-
ment. Similar to Experiment 1, these associations were
discontinued in blocks 17 and 18 (Table 1).
We performed two GLMMs considering as dependent vari-
ables either the accuracy or the RT. The only main difference
with the previous analyses was the independent factor named
GROUP, which indicated to which group the subject was as-
signed (either color–motion association or color–response
association).
Results
The first GLMM performed on accuracy (Fig. 6) revealed a signifi-
cant effect of the factors BLOCK (F(11,198) ¼ 4.07, P < 0.001),
ASSOCIATION (F(1,14098) ¼ 8.16, P ¼ 0.0043), and their interac-
tion (F(11,14098) ¼ 3.12, P < 0.001). A post-hoc analysis of the in-
teraction revealed a significant effect of ASSOCIATION for
blocks 9, 12, 13, 15, and 16 (all t < 2.10, Tukey–Kramer
Figure 5. Performance data from Experiment 3. The informative/non-
informative colors are represented in red/blue. Error bars represent
standard errors. The violation of the association in block 16th and
17th is marked by the light green rectangle. The data from the “per-
ceptual training” phase with white patches (from 1 to 7) is not
displayed.
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corrected P < 0.03). Surprisingly, the post-hoc analysis revealed
also a significant difference in block 18, the second block in
which the rules were violated, but highlighting a higher accu-
racy for the noninformative color (t ¼ 2.11, P ¼ 0.0347). In the
last two blocks, when the rules were restored, no difference
emerged from the post-hoc analysis (block 19: t ¼ 0.88, P ¼
0.3787, block 20: t ¼ 0.26, P > 0.250). Crucially, no difference be-
tween the two groups emerged (GROUP: F(1,14098) ¼ 0.00, P >
0.250; GROUP  ASSOCIATION F(1,14098) ¼ 1.98, P ¼ 0.1592;
GROUP ASSOCIATION  BLOCK F(11,14098) ¼ 0.66, P ¼ 0.7751),
indicating that both groups learnt equally well. The BF compar-
ing the model with and without the factor GROUP confirmed
this lack of significant effect (BF ¼ 2.1138  1018, P < 0.0001).
Regarding the analysis of the RT (Supplementary Fig. S1), only
the BLOCK factor and the BLOCK  GROUP interaction revealed
a significant effect (BLOCK: F(11,198) ¼ 10.45, P < 0.001, BLOCK
 GROUP F(11,13832) ¼ 1.83, P ¼ 0.0438); no effect of the factor
ASSOCIATION (F(1,13832) ¼ 1.83, P ¼ 0.1758) or GROUP
(F(1,13832) ¼ 2.71, P ¼ 0.0996) was revealed. Regarding the
BLOCK  GROUP interaction, none of the pairwise post-hoc com-
parisons showed a significant difference between the groups,
suggesting that the effect was driven by different trends in the
two groups, with the first group reducing its reaction time
abruptly in the 5th block (Supplementary Fig. S1). Finally, we
compared the results from Experiments 1 and 4, adding to the
GROUP variable a level accounting for the data from Experiment
1. GROUP was thus composed of three levels: two for each group
of Experiment 4 and one for Experiment 1. No difference be-
tween the groups was revealed by the GLMM (GROUP 
ASSOCIATION: F(2,28043), P > 0.25), as confirmed by the BF
analysis performed comparing the BIC of the model with and
without the interaction GROUP  ASSOCIATION (BF ¼ 1.406 
107, P < 0.001).
Discussion
In contrast to our expectation, we found that both the sensory–
sensory and the sensory–motor associations were learnt equally
well, with no difference between the groups. This suggests that
the mechanisms involved in this type of associative learning
are general rather than modality-specific, and that the events
whose association gets unconsciously learned do not have to be
perfectly concurrent in time, since the response followed the
color by a few hundreds of milliseconds.
General Discussion
In the present study, we investigated whether participants can
learn unconsciously a direct association between supraliminal
features of task-relevant stimuli. The results showed robust and
reliable learning of the association. Importantly, in Experiment
2 we directly tested the degree of awareness of such learning in
light of the four criteria suggested by Shanks and Newell in 1994
(Dawson and Reardon, 1973; Newell and Shanks, 2014; Shanks
and Stjohn, 1994). Briefly, these criteria require that the assess-
ment of awareness should be devoid of biasing factors not rele-
vant for the behavioral measure (reliability), that they should be
performed immediately after the experiment (immediacy), and
under optimal retrieval conditions (sensitivity; Newell and
Shanks, 2014). The fourth crucial criterion is the relevance crite-
rion (Shanks and Stjohn, 1994), which stipulates that the test of
awareness should target the very same information that drives
changes in behavior. In our design, given the simple nature of
the learned association, it is easy to fulfill both the reliability
and relevance criteria. Whereas in standard implicit learning
paradigms, participants may potentially achieve success by ex-
ploiting information that the test of awareness fails to probe, in
our case, the simplicity of the contingency excludes this possi-
bility. Indeed, only the learning of the association between the
color of the dots and the direction of their motion can lead to
the improvement in accuracy that we observed. Further, we ex-
tensively probed participants’ conscious knowledge of this as-
sociation directly by means of generation and familiarity tasks,
and through a questionnaire. Regarding the sensitivity criterion,
our Bayesian approach made it possible to convincingly con-
clude [BF > 30 (Dienes, 2011)] that our null findings can be in-
terpreted as offering support for the absence of differences
rather than as resulting from a lack of sensitivity (Vadillo et al.,
2015). Finally, regarding the immediacy criterion, we adminis-
tered the tests as soon as the learning phase ended, so reducing
the effect of interference or forgetting as much as possible. It is
noteworthy that, during the generative task, the group who did
not report the correct association in the questionnaire per-
formed at random when coupling the colors with the motion di-
rections. This is a substantive finding because it suggests that
the color–motion association is used only in the narrow context
of the task in which it was learned and cannot be transferred to
different task-sets (Graf and Schacter, 1985; Shanks et al., 1997).
We believe that our study provides the first demonstration
of unconscious learning of simple associations, thereby filling
the gap in the theoretical framework illustrated in Fig. 1.
Previous studies in the framework of delay conditioning (Clark
and Squire, 1998; Clark et al., 2002), fear conditioning (Maren,
2001) or in the context of the relationship between unconscious
processing and perceptual load (Bahrami et al., 2008; Carmel
et al., 2007) could be viewed as providing already indirect evi-
dence for unconscious learning of supraliminal stimuli.
However, these studies did not test systematically the
Table 3. Associations between color, motion direction, and response
in Experiment 4
Color–motion group
Block i
Color Motion Answer
Color 1 Upward Right
Color 2 Downward Left
Color 3 U/D R/L
Block iþ1
Color Motion Answer
Color 1 Upward Left
Color 2 Downward Right
Color 3 U/D R/L
Color–response group
Block i
Color Motion Answer
Color 1 Upward Right
Color 2 Downward Left
Color 3 U/D R/L
Block iþ1
Color Motion Answer
Color 1 Downward Right
Color 2 Upward Left
Color 3 U/D R/L
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awareness of the learned association, thus failing to address the
criteria discussed above (Shanks and Stjohn, 1994). One of the
possible reasons for this lack of previous demonstration of the
unconscious learning of simple associations could be that de-
signing an experiment in which the association between per-
ceivable stimulus features is unconsciously learnt was quite
challenging. On the one hand, the predictive cue should be per-
ceived and actively processed by the participants in order to af-
fect their behavior (Jiang and Chun, 2001; Jimenez and Mendez,
1999); on the other hand, the contingency with the other feature
should remain implicit. The balance between these two ex-
tremes was difficult to obtain. One important aspect of our task
is that the color had to be processed actively by the participants
because of the secondary task, which consisted in reporting the
color of the patch in 10% of the trials. Nevertheless, participants
failed to perceive explicitly the association, possibly because of
what can be defined as “a change of narrative”: the secondary
task related to the predictive cue is a sufficiently convincing jus-
tification for the presence of the colors in the task, such that
participants do not have to search for an explanation, which
would eventually lead them to figure out the association
(Shanks, 2003). Future experiments should further investigate
whether this interpretation holds true. Furthermore, the pres-
ence of the secondary color task allows us to exclude inatten-
tional amnesia as an alternative interpretation (Wolfe, 1999),
since it compelled the participants to direct actively their atten-
tion to the colors during the task.
Whereas in Experiments 1 and 2, we provide evidence in fa-
vor of the learning without awareness of the color–motion asso-
ciation, in Experiments 3 and 4 we investigate the possible
mechanisms involved in this type of learning. Specifically,
Experiment 3 showed that auditory feedback was necessary for
learning to occur, thus evoking reinforcement learning (Niv,
2009), while Experiment 4 showed that both the color–motion
and the color–response associations were learnt. Feedback can,
in some cases, be processed as a reward signal and induce a
phasic dopaminergic response (Hyman et al., 2006) which would
then reinforce the circuits that link the color with the motion
features or the color with the response representation. This in-
terpretation concurs with a recent review on the pharmacology
of implicit learning suggesting a similar link with dopaminergic
systems (Udde´n et al., 2010).
Conclusion
In conclusion, we provide a novel and robust experimental de-
sign that can be used to investigate unconscious associative
learning, and we have begun to decipher its basic mechanistic
features. However, many important questions remain unan-
swered. For instance, we found a large inter individual variabil-
ity in both the magnitude of the learning and the level of
awareness of the association. Exploring the extent to which at-
tention, working memory capacity or cognitive control
(Stillman et al., 2014) are involved in this variability is an impor-
tant goal for further research.
Supplementary data
Supplementary data is available at Neuroscience of
Consciousness Journal online.
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Figure 6. Performance in Experiment 4. In the upper panel, the data
from the group in which the color–motion association was kept con-
stant (n ¼ 12) is shown, and in the lower panel the data from the
group in which the color–response association was kept constant is
represented (n ¼ 12). The red and blue dots correspond to the infor-
mative and noninformative colors, respectively. Error bars represent
standard errors, and violation of the association in block 16th and
17th is marked by the light green rectangle. The data from the “per-
ceptual training” phase with white patches (from 1 to 8) is not dis-
played in the figure.
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